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Abstract 
 
Consider a non-experimental evaluation problem where binary treatment is assigned to an 
individual if and only if Vi > v0, where Vi = vi + ei, and v0 is a known threshold. Vi is observable, 
but vi and ei are not. vi can depend on the individual's characteristics or behavior, but not on the 
random error ei, which is assumed to have continuous pdf. This paper formally establishes that 
treatment status here is, in the limit, randomized in a neighborhood of Vi = v0. Causal inferences 
from a regression-discontinuity analysis of this kind of mechanism can thus be as internally valid 
as those drawn from a randomized experiment: treatment status will be locally independent of all 
pre-assignment variables. This principle is illustrated in an analysis of U.S. House elections, 
where the inherent uncertainty in the final vote count is plausible, which would imply that the 
party that wins is essentially randomized among elections decided by a narrow margin. The 
evidence is consistent with this prediction, which is then used to generate “near-experimental” 
causal estimates of the electoral advantage to incumbency. 
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There is a recent renewed interest in identiﬁc a t i o na n de s t i m a t i o ni n( H a h n ,T o d d ,a n dv a nd e r
Klaauw, 2001; Porter, 2003), and the application (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; van der Klaauw 2002) of
Thistlethwaite and Campbell’s (1960) regression-discontinuity design (RDD). RD designs involve a di-
chotomous treatment that is a deterministic function of an single, observed, continuous covariate. Treat-
ment is given if the covariate crosses a known threshold. Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001) formally
establish minimal continuity assumptions for identifying treatment effects in the RDD. The assumptions
dictate that the average outcome for individuals marginally below the threshold must represent a valid
counterfactual for the treated group just above the threshold.
This paper formally establishes why causal inferences from RD designs can sometimes be as cred-
ible as those drawn from a randomized experiment. Consider the following mechanism for treatment
assignment. Each subject i =1 ,...,N is assigned a score Vi, which is inﬂuenced partially by 1) the indi-
vidual’s attributes and actions, and partially by 2) random chance. For example Vi = vi + ei,w h e r evi –
varying across individuals – may reﬂect characteristics or behavior of the individual; but it does not depend
on the random draw from “nature”, ei. Suppose that ei’s probability density is continuous. Treatment is
g i v e nt os u b j e c ti if and only if the observed composite score Vi is greater than a known threshold v0.
It is proven below that this mechanism not only satisﬁes the minimal assumptions for RD designs
outlined in Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001); it additionally guarantees that the treatment status
indicator shares the same statistical properties as treatment status from a classical randomized experiment.
In particular, in a neighborhood of Vi = v0 (and in the limit), all variables determined prior to assignment
will be independent of treatment status. Thus – as in a randomized experiment – differences in post-
assignment outcomes will not be confounded by omitted variables, whether observable or unobservable.
The local random assignment result has the following implications. First, it illustrates that natural
randomized experiments can be isolated even when treatment status for the entire population is determined
by non-random selection. For example, if Vi were the vote share obtained by a political candidate, vi
1could be dependent on her political experience, so that on average, those who receive the treatment of
winning the election (Vi > 1
2) are systematically more experienced. Even in this situation, provided that
the random chance error ei has continuous pdf, variability in treatment status in a neighborhood of Vi = v0
is statistically randomized.
Second, the result gives theoretical justiﬁcation for a strong empirical test of the internal validity
of the RDD. In a neighborhood of v0, treated and control groups should possess the same distribution of
baseline characteristics. The applied researcher can therefore verify – as in a randomized controlled trial –
whether or not the randomization “worked”, by examining whether there are treatment-control differences
in the baseline covariates. These speciﬁcation tests are not based on additional assumptions; rather, they
are auxiliary predictions – consequences of the assignment mechanism described above. The local random
assignment result also gives theoretical justiﬁcation for expecting impact estimates to be insensitive to the
inclusion of any function of any combination of baseline covariates in the analysis.1
Finally, the conditions for the result can help researchers assess whether an RDD analysis is likely
to be appropriate for a given context. For example, as discussed below, absent the random draw from nature
ei, the local random assignment result need not follow. Some simple examples show that where individ-
uals have precise control over their own value of Vi, the RDD is likely to yield biased impact estimates.
Economic behavior can thus sometimes corrupt the RD design.
The result is applied to an analysis of the incumbency advantage in elections to the United States
House of Representatives. It is plausible that the exact vote count in large elections, while inﬂuenced by
political actors in a non-random way, is also partially determined by chance beyond any actor’s control.
Even on the day of an election, there is inherent uncertainty about the precise and ﬁnal vote count. In light
of this uncertainty, the local independence result predicts that the districts where a party’s candidate just
barely won an election – and hence barely became the incumbent – are likely to be comparable in all other
waystodistrictswheretheparty’scandidatejustbarelylost the election. Differences in the electoral success
between these two groups in the next election thus identiﬁes the causal party incumbency advantage.
1 This second point is suggested in the conclusion of Hahn, Todd, and van der Klauww (2001).
2Results from data on elections to the United States House of Representatives (1946-1998) yields
the following ﬁndings. First, the evidence is consistent with the strong predictions of local random as-
signment of incumbency status around the 50 percent vote share threshold. Among close electoral races,
the districts where a party wins or loses are similar along ex ante, pre-determined characteristics. Second,
party incumbency is found to have a signiﬁcant causal effect on the probability that a political party will
retain the district’s seat in the next Congress; it increases the probability on the order of 0.40 to 0.45.2 The
magnitude of the effect on the vote share is about 0.08. Second, losing an election reduces the probability
of a candidate running again for ofﬁce by about 0.43, consistent with an enormous deterrence effect.
Section 2 provides a brief background on regression-discontinuity designs, reviews the key statisti-
cal propertiesand implicationsof truly randomized experiments, and formally establishes howthe treatment
assignment mechanism described above can share those properties. Section 3 describes the inference prob-
lem, data issues, and the empirical results of an RDD analysis of the incumbency advantage in the U.S.
House. Section 4 concludes.
2 Random assignment from non-random selection
In a regression-discontinuity design (RDD) the researcher possesses knowledge that treatment is
g i v e nt oi n d i v i d u a l si fa n do n l yi fa no b s e r v e dc o v a r i a t eV crosses a known threshold v0.3 In Thistlethwaite
and Campbell’s (1960) original application of the RDD, an award was given to students who obtained a
minimum score on an scholarship examination. OLS was used to estimate differences in future academic
outcomes between the students who scored just above and below the passing threshold. This discontinuity
gap was attributed to the effect of the test-based award.
Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001) was the ﬁr s tt ol i n kt h eR D Dt ot h et r e a t m e n te f f e c t s
literature, and to formally explore the sources of identiﬁcation that underlie the research design. There, it
2 As discussed below, the causal effect for the individual that I consider is the effect on the probability of both becoming a
candidate and winning the subsequent election. Below I discuss the inherent difﬁculty in isolating the causal effect conditional on
running for re-election.
3 More generally, there are two types of designs: the so-called “sharp” and “fuzzy” designs, as described in Hahn, Todd, and van
der Klaauw (2001). This paper focuses on the sharp RD.
3is established that the mere treatment assignment rule itself is insufﬁcient to identify any average treatment
effect, and that identiﬁcation relies on the assumption that outcomes of those individuals marginally below
the threshold represent what would have been the outcomes for those marginally above, in the absence of
the treatment. One of Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw’s (2001) important results is that this amounts to
assuming continuity in mean potential outcomes at the discontinuity threshold:
E [Y0|V = v] and E [Y1|V = v] are continuous in v at v0 (1)
where Y1 and Y0 denote the potential outcomes under the treatment and control states.4 This insight makes
clear that the credibility of RDD impact estimates depend crucially on assumptions about the comparability
of individuals marginally below and above the threshold v0. Two questions, then, seem relevant when con-
sidering whether an RDD should be applied: 1) What characteristics of a treatment assignment mechanism
would ensure that these continuity conditions are satisﬁed? and 2) Would there be any theoretically justiﬁed
way to empirically test whether “comparability” assumptions hold?
It is formally established below that if the probability density of V for each individual is non-
degenerate and continuous, not only are the above continuity assumptions satisﬁed; additionally, the treat-
ment status indicator – in a neighborhood of V = v0 – shares the same statistical properties as treatment
status from a classical randomized experiment. Impact estimates, then, can share the same validity as those
from randomized experiments. Also, the local independence result implies a direct test of the continuous
density assumption. All variables determined before V should be identically distributed in the treatment
and control states in a neighborhood of V = v0.
2.1 Review of Classical Randomized Experiments
This section reviews the formal properties and implications of classical randomized experiments. The
next section will illustrate how a non-random treatment assignment mechanism shares these properties and
implications – among individuals with scores close to the RD threshold.
Consider a population of N individuals who will be given or denied treatment on the basis of
4 This is a re-statement of Assumptions (A1) and (A2) in Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001).
4random chance. Assume that each individual, indexed by i =1 ,...,N, will be assigned a score Vi,g i v e n
by a random-number generator.
Assumption A1 Vi is non-degenerate, and i.i.d. across individuals, with cdf F (z)
Assumption B Di =1if Vi > 0, Di =0otherwise
Treatment is given to the subject if and only if Vi > 0; 0 is chosen, without loss of generality, to
be the cutoff point that determines treatment status. Di is the indicator variable for the receipt of treatment.
This two-step process is, of course, equivalent to assignment based on any other randomizing device, but
this particular mechanism will be useful for drawing parallels with the RDD case in the next section.
Assumption C1 For each individual i, there exist two scalars, Yi (1) and Yi (0), which denote poten-
tial outcomes under the treatment and control states.
Let Yi be the observed outcome of interest, and since we observe an individual in only one of the
two states, it is follows that Yi = DiYi (1) + (1 − Di)Yi (0).L e t I be a random variable that denotes
the identity of an individual randomly drawn from this experiment; it takes on values I =1 ,...,N.S o
DI, for example, denotes the value of the treatment indicator for the randomly drawn individual from the
population. For each individual i,l e tt h e r ee x i s tas i n g l es c a l a r ,Xi that denotes a measurement on any
characteristic that is already determined at the outset of the experiment; Xi is thus not random. But XI –
the value of the variable for a randomly drawn individual from the population – is random.
The well-known implications of the randomized experiment can be summarized as follows:
Theorem 1 If Assumptions A1, B, and C1 hold, then:
a)
Pr[I = i|DI =1 ]=P r[ I = i|DI =0 ]=P r[ I = i]=
1
N
, ∀i =1 ,...,N (2)
b)
E [YI|DI =1 ]− E [YI|DI =0 ]=
N X
i=1
Pr[I = i][Yi (1) − Yi (0)] ≡ ATE (3)
c)
Pr[XI ≤ x|DI =1 ] =
X
i:Xi≤x
Pr[I = i|DI =1 ]= (4)
X
i:Xi≤x
Pr[I = i|DI = 0 ]=P r [ XI ≤ x|DI =0 ], ∀x ∈ <
5Proof a) follows from directly from Assumptions A1, B, and Bayes’ rule: Pr[DI =1 |I = i]=
1 − F (0),a n dPr[DI =1 |I = i]=F (0) ⇒ Pr[I = i|DI =1 ]=P r[ I = i|DI =0 ]=P r[ I = i]= 1
N.
b) directly follows from a) and Assumption C1; a) implies c). Q.E.D.
a) means that the random assignment ensures that the randomly drawn individual will have the
same chance of being individual i, whether or not in the treatment or control group, for all i =1 ,...,N.b )
states that the difference in the conditional means will identify the average treatment effect (ATE)f o rt h e
population. c) states another important consequence of random assignment. It states that any variable that
is determined prior to the random assignment will have the same cumulative distribution function in either
the treatment or control state. This formalizes why analysts expect baseline characteristics – determined
before randomization – to be on average the same in both treatment and control groups.
2.2 Random Assignment from a Regression Discontinuity Design
Even when selection into treatment status is non-random for the entire population, it is nevertheless possi-
ble to isolate randomized variation in treatment status. Consider what happens when the random-number
generator that produces the score Vi varies arbitrarily across individuals. For example, if Vi is the eventual
vote share for a political candidate, candidates will differ in their ability to inﬂuence the vote, and some
candidates will have a greater chance of winning than others. As a result, those who do eventually re-
ceive treatment (win the election) can be expected to be comprised of relatively more “able” or experienced
politicians.
Assumption A2 Vi is non-degenerate for some i, independent across i, with individual-speciﬁcp d f
fi (z) and cdf Fi (z)
fi (z) and Fi (z), and hence Pr[DI =1 |I = i] are allowed to vary across individuals. When this
is true, Pr[I = i|DI =1 ] 6=P r [ I = i|DI =0 ] , in general. Theorem 1 will not hold, and the simple
difference E [YI|DI =1 ]− E [YI|DI =0 ]is generally biased for the average treatment effect.
In spite of this non-random selection, this kind of mechanism generates variation in the treatment
that is as good as if it were generated by a randomized experiment. In addition, assume
6Assumption A3 For each individual i with non-degenerate Vi, fi (z) is continuous on the real line.
Theorem 2 If Assumptions A2, A3, B, and C1 hold, then:
a)
lim
∆→0+ Pr[I = i|0 <V I < ∆]=
fi (0)
PN
i=1 fi (0)
= lim
∆→0+ Pr[I = i| − ∆ <V I < 0] (5)
∀i =1 ,...,N
b)
lim
∆→0+ E [YI|0 <V I < ∆] − lim
∆→0+ E [YI| − ∆ <V I < 0] (6)
=
N X
i=1
fi (0)
PN
i=1 fi (0)
[Yi (1) − Yi (0)] = ATE∗
c)
lim
∆→0+ Pr[XI ≤ x|0 <V I < ∆]=
X
i:Xi≤x
fi (0)
PN
i=1 fi (0)
= lim
∆→0+ Pr[XI ≤ x| − ∆ <V I < 0] (7)
∀x ∈ <
Proof By Bayes’ rule and A2, we have Pr[I = i|0 <V I < ∆]=
[Fi(∆)−Fi(0)] P N
i=1[Fi(∆)−Fi(0)] and Pr[I = i|
−∆ <V I < 0] =
[Fi(0)−Fi(−∆)] P N
i=1[Fi(0)−Fi(∆)]. Taking limits and using A3 yields a). b) follows directly from a), B,
and C1; a) directly implies c). Q.E.D.
Equation 5 is the analogy to Equation 2, and it means that any randomly drawn individual has the
same probability of being individual i, whether in the treatment or control state, for all i =1 ,...,N –
within a neighborhood of VI =0 . In a neighborhood of VI =0 , treatment is essentially randomly assigned.
The immediate implication of this is b): the difference in means – the regression discontinuity
gap – identiﬁes an average treatment effect. This is the analogy to Equation 3. It makes clear that this
assignment mechanism leads to identiﬁcation of an internally valid treatment effect, but at the same time
the causal effect does not apply to the entire population of interest; ATE∗ will in general differ from
ATE. Nevertheless, the individual-speciﬁcw e i g h t su s e di nATE∗ are somewhat intuitive: they roughly
correspond to the relative likelihood (at the outset of the “experiment”) that an individual will be in a
neighborhood of VI =0 . Furthermore, as Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001) have suggested, ATE∗
may be the precise quantity of interest, if one were interested in the causal effect of a program on the
marginalgroup ofindividualsaffectedbya smallchange inthe threshold. Finally, asc)states, thistreatment
7assignment mechanism generates strong testable predictions. Any variable determined prior to treatment
assignment should have the same distribution in both states, in a neighborhood of VI =0 . c) is the analogy
to Equation 4.
Finally, it is clear that the implications of Theorems 2 and 3 satisfy the minimal continuity assump-
tions (Equation 1) of Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw since
E [YI (j)|VI = v]=
N X
i=1
fi (v)
PN
i=1 fi (v)
Yi (j), j =0 ,1 (8)
is continuous in v, by assumption A3.
It should be noted that Assumption C1 is not merely a convention of notation; it is a substantive
assumption that dictates that the random draw from “nature” does not itself have an impact on the outcome
– except through its impact on treatment status. That is, it assumes that Vi does not independently impact
Yi (0) or Yi (1). In the case of a randomized experiment, this is certainly plausible; the precise draw an indi-
vidual obtains from a random number generator should not affect the outcome, except through inﬂuencing
Di.
In a non-experimental setting, however, this may be less justiﬁable. For example, a politician may
marginally beneﬁt in the next election from having a higher vote share – perhaps because a higher vote
share will convince donors to contribute more money for the next election. In this case, it is necessary to
re-consider whether or not ATE∗ (or ATE) are meaningful concepts. In particular, what would it mean to
lose the election, even after winning 90 percent of the vote, or to win the election when an opponent has 90
percent of the vote? As another example, suppose a scholarship is awarded to a student solely on the basis
of scoring 70 percent or higher on a particular examination. What does it mean to receive the merit-based
scholarship even while scoring a 50 on the test, or to be denied the scholarship even after scoring a 90?
In these contexts, Yi (1) is simply not deﬁned for those with Vi < 0,a n dYi (0) is not deﬁned for
those with Vi > 0. They are not deﬁned because individuals will never receive the treatment if Vi < 0,a n d
will always receive treatment if Vi > 0. It may nevertheless be of interest to know the “impact” of holding
a district seat on future electoral outcomes, as it would to know the effect on future academic outcomes of
8winning a test-based scholarship. In these situations, one must consider whether, for each individual i,i ti s
plausible that a discontinuous jump in the relation between Yi and Vi c a nb ea t t r i b u t e dt ot h ec h a n g ei nDi.
When this is deemed plausible, Theorem 2 must be slightly modiﬁed. Let Yi (z) denote a response
function for individual i, where the outcome for individual i, who draws Vi = z0,i sYi (z0). This is
an analogy to the potential outcomes “function” in Assumption C1, but the domain is continuous rather
than discrete. Let this “potential outcomes” function be deﬁned everywhere on the support of Vi except at
Vi =0 .D e ﬁne Y −
i ≡ lim∆→0+ Yi (−∆) and Y +
i ≡ lim∆→0+ Yi (∆), when those limits exist.
Assumption C2 Yi (z) is everywhere continuous in its domain.
In this case, Theorem 2 can be substituted with
Theorem 3 If Assumptions A2, A3, and C2 hold, then a) and c) of Theorem 2 hold, and
b)
lim
∆→0+ E [YI|0 <V I < ∆] − lim
∆→0+ E [YI| − ∆ <V I < 0] (9)
=
N X
i=1
fi (0)
PN
i=1 fi (0)
£
Y +
i − Y −
i
¤
= ATE∗∗
Proofa)andc)followasfromTheorem2. Asforb), lim∆→0+ E [YI|0 <V I < ∆]−lim∆→0+ E[YI|
−∆ <V I < 0] = lim∆→0+
PN
i=1 Pr[I = i| 0 <V I < ∆]YI (VI)− lim∆→0+
PN
i=1 Pr[I = i| −∆ <V I <
0]YI (VI). By using a), taking limits and C2, we obtain
PN
i=1
fi(0) P N
i=1 fi(0)
£
Y +
i − Y −
i
¤
. Q.E.D.
ATE∗∗ is a weighted average of individual-speciﬁc discontinuity gaps Y +
i − Y −
i , with the same
w e i g h t sa si nT h e o r e m2 .
2.3 Self-selection and random chance
The continuity assumption A3 is crucial to the local random assignment result. If for any i, the density of
Vi is discontinuous at the cutoff point, then a) from either Theorem 2 or Theorem 3 will not hold, and hence
neither will b) or c). This is important to note because there is a close link between the plausibility of A3
and the ability of agents to sort around the discontinuity threshold. When agents have precise control over
their own value of Vi, it is possible that A3 will not hold, and the RDD could then lead to biased impact
estimates.
9For example, suppose a nontrivial fraction of political candidates had the ability to dispute and
invalidate up to 0.1 percent of the ballots cast for his opponent, after the election. Suppose these candidates
plan to invalidate a sufﬁcient number of votes to win the election if the initial count reveals that he will lose
by 0.1 percent (or less) of the vote, but will do nothing if the initial count shows he will win. If this rule is
followed, at the outset of the election, the density of Vi w o u l db ez e r oj u s tb e l o wt h e5 0p e r c e n tt h r e s h o l d ,
and positive just above the threshold. The local random assignment result from Theorem 2 or 3 would not
hold, as “close winners” are more likely to be composed of the candidates with the ability to inﬂuence the
outcome after the initial ballots are cast. This kind of self-selection thus suggests use of the RDD would be
invalid.
Ontheotherhand, supposethat thiskindofpost-electionbehaviorisprohibited. Then, assumptions
A2 and A3 are likely to hold. Political candidates could inﬂuence the vote – on average – but they would
not have precise control over the exact vote tally. On the day of an election, while there are forecasts of the
outcome, no one knows precisely what the ﬁnal vote tally will be. Who wins the election is arguably the
most uncertain among electoral races that are expected to be closely contested. If candidates do not have
precise control over the ﬁnal vote tally, it difﬁcult to justify why Vi would have a discontinuous density at
the 50 percent threshold.
One way to formalize the difference between these two examples is to consider that Vi is the sum of
two components: Vi = vi + ei. vi denotes the systematic, or predictable component of Vi that can depend
on the individuals’ attributes and/or actions (e.g. campaign resources, visibility, political experience), and
ei is an exogenous, random chance component (e.g. weather, amount of trafﬁc, etc. on election day), with
a continuous density. In the ﬁrst example, vi depends on what happens in the initial vote count, and hence
on ei. If the candidate was lucky enough to win by a few votes, the candidate does not dispute the election;
if unlucky to lose by a few votes, he will dispute ballots until he wins. In the second example, vi does not
depend on ei: “random chance” has the ﬁnal say in the determination of Vi.
These two examples illustrate that the mechanism given by A2, A3, B, and C1 (or C2) generates
random assignment even in the presence of endogenous sorting, as long as agents are prohibited from
10sorting precisely around the threshold. If they can, the density of Vi is likely to be discontinuous, especially
if there are beneﬁts to receiving the treatment. If they cannot – perhaps because there is ultimately some
unpredictable, anduncontrollable(fromthepointofviewoftheindividual)componenttoVi –the continuity
of the density may be justiﬁable.
2.4 Relation to Selection Models
The treatment assignment mechanism described above has some generality. Its statistical properties are im-
plicitly assumed in typical econometric models for evaluation studies. For example, consider the reduced-
form formulation of Heckman’s (1978) dummy endogenous-variable model:
y1 = x1α1 + dβ + u1 (10)
y∗
2 = x2α2 + u2
d =1 if y∗
2 > 0
=0 if y∗
2 ≤ 0
where y1 is the outcome of interest, d is the treatment indicator, x1 and x2 are exogenous variables and
(u1,u 2) are error terms that are typically assumed to be bivariate normal and jointly independent of x1 and
x2. An exclusion restriction typically dictates that x2 contains some variables that do not appear in x1.
Letting y∗
2 = Vi, x2α2 = vi,a n du2 = ei, and for each individual with u1 = u, Yi (1) =
x1α1 + β + u and Yi (0) = x1α1 + u, it is clear that this model satisﬁes the properties A2, A3, B, C1
and C2. How to estimate β depends on what variables are available. When y∗
2 is unobservable, as in most
cases, two-step estimation, maximum likelihood estimation, or instrumental variables is often employed.
It becomes necessary to assume that all variables in x1 and x2 are available to the researcher. It is crucial
to have the complete set of x1 and x2, for otherwise estimates α1, α2,a n dβ will be biased by omitted
variables.
When, on the other hand, the researcher is fortunate enough to directly observe y∗
2 –a si nt h eR D D
– none of thevariables in x1 or x2 are needed for the estimation of β. If available to the researcher, elements
11of x1 and x2 (insofar as they are known to have been determined prior to the assignment of d), they can be
usedtocheckthevalidityofthecontinuityassumption A3, which drivesthelocalrandomassignmentresult.
Theorems 2 and 3 suggest this can be done by examining the difference lim∆→0+ E [x1|0 <y ∗
2 < ∆] −
lim∆→0+ E [x1| − ∆ <y ∗
2 < 0]. Ifthe localrandomassignmentresultholds, this differenceshould bezero.
Thevariablesx1 andx2 serveanotherpurposeinthissituation. Theycanbeincludedinaregressionanalysis
to reduce sampling variability in the impact estimates. This is the common use of baseline characteristics
in the analysis of randomized experiments.
It should be noted that the connection between RDD and selection models is not speciﬁct ot h e
parametric version of Equation 10. The arguments can be easily extended for a model that relaxes any
one of the assumptions in Equation 10:the linearity of the indices x1α1 or x2α2, the joint normality of the
errors, or the implied constant treatment effect assumption.
3 RDD analysis of the Incumbency Advantage in the U.S. House
3.1 The Inference Problem in Measuring the Incumbency Advantage
One of the most striking facts of congressional politics in the United States is the consistently high rate
of electoral success of incumbents, and the electoral advantage of incumbency is one of the most studied
aspects of recent research on elections to the U.S. House [Gelman and King, 1990]. For the U.S. House
of Representatives, in any given election year, the incumbent party in a given congressional district will
likely win. The solid line in Figure I shows that this re-election rate is about 90 percent and has been fairly
stable over the past 50 years.5 Well-known in the political science literature, the electoral success of the
incumbent party is also reﬂected in the two-party vote share, which is about 60 to 70 percent during the
same period.6
As might be expected, incumbent candidates also enjoy a high electoral success rate. Figure I
shows that the winning candidate has typically had an 80 percent chance of both running for re-election and
5 Calculated from data on historical election returns from ICPSR study 7757. See Data Appendix for details. Note that the
“incumbent party” is undeﬁned for years that end with ‘2’ due to decennial congressional re-districting.
6 See, for example, the overview in Jacobson [1997].
12ultimately winning. This is slightly lower, because the probability that an incumbent will be a candidate
in the next election is about 88 percent, and the probability of winning, conditional on running for election
is about 90 percent. By contrast, the runner-up candidate typically had a 3 percent chance of becoming a
candidate and winning the next election. The probability that the runner-up even becomes a candidate in
the next election is about 20 percent during this period.
The overwhelming success of House incumbents draws public attention whenever concerns arise
that Representatives are using the privileges and resources of ofﬁce to gain an “unfair” advantage over
potential challengers. Indeed, the casual observer is tempted to interpret Figure I as evidence that there
is an electoral advantage to incumbency – that winning has a causal inﬂuence on the probability that the
candidate will run for ofﬁce again and eventually be elected. It is well-known, however, that the simple
comparison of incumbent and non-incumbent electoral outcomes does not necessarily represent anything
about a true electoral advantage of being an incumbent.
As is well-articulated in Erikson [1971], the inference problem involves the possibility of a “re-
ciprocal causal relationship”. Some – potentially all – of the difference is due to a simple selection effect:
incumbents are, by deﬁnition, those politicians who were successful in the previous election. If what makes
them successful is somewhat persistent over time, they should be expected to be somewhat more successful
when running for re-election.
3.2 Model
The ideal thought experiment for measuring the incumbency advantage would exogenously change the
incumbent party in a district from, for example, Republican to Democrat, while keeping all other factors
constant. The corresponding increase in Democratic success in the next election would represent the overall
electoral beneﬁt that accrued to the party from holding the district seat. The RDD inherent in the U.S.
Congressional electoral system arguably delivers (in the limit) this ideal experiment.
The vote share in districts where the Democrat barely wins an election (say, by a few votes) will by
construction be virtually the same as the share where the Democrat barely lost. Furthermore – as Theorem
132 and 3 state – if the random chance component to the vote share has smooth density, which one of the two
parties that wins a closely contested election will be independent of all variables determined prior to the
initial election. All else will be equal – on average. The simple difference in how Democrats perform in the
next election thus would provide a credible estimate of the electoral beneﬁt of incumbency.
This is formalized in the following model. Assume that there two parties and consider two consec-
utive elections
Vi1 = gi1 (Vi0)+ei1 (11)
Vi2 = gi2 (Vi1)+ei2
git (v) ≡ E [Vit|Vit−1 = v] (12)
eit ≡ Vit − git (v) (13)
git :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1]
git continuous on [0,1], except possibly at v =
1
2
eit has pdf fit (z|v), continuous in z on <
where Vi2 is the vote share for the Democratic candidate in Congressional district i in election period 2. Vi1
and Vi0 are the vote shares in the same district in periods 1 and 0. There are only two stochastic elements
to the model, ei1 and ei2. Vi0 is a ﬁxed scalar for each individual i.
The ﬁrst two equations state that the exact vote share is uncertain, but the expected value can
depend on the actions of the candidate, party, as well as their characteristics, as well as the attributes of the
district. The multitude of factors represented by git might include differences in the two parties in campaign
expenditures, the “charisma” of the candidates, the political experience of candidates, the partisan make-up
of the voters in the district, and of course, the advantages of being the incumbent. git is a function of Vit−1
becausehowpolitical actorsbehave may bea function of howwellthe parties performed inthe lastelection.
The subscript i on the function g, however, emphasizes that Vit−1 need not be the only determinant. The
implicit district-speciﬁc intercept in git means that there are many observed and unobserved factors that
contribute to Vit.
14eit is the ex post forecast error. Ex ante, it represents a random chance element in the determination
of Vit. This second category of factors might include, for example, turnout on election day. While political
forecasters always have predictions about the expected level of turnout, no one knows exactly how many
people will vote. Indeed, how many people did eventually vote is typically unknown until well after voting
booths close. eit is meant to capture objective uncertainty about the exact vote tally on election day. The
last statement above is that conditional on Vit the density of this error is smooth.
Whether political parties enjoy a “boost” in their vote share from being the incumbent party is
really a question about the size of any discontinuous upward jump in the function gi2 at Vi1 = 1
2:
g+
i2 − g−
i2 ≡ lim
∆→0+
gi2
µ
1
2
+ ∆
¶
− lim
∆→0+
gi2
µ
1
2
− ∆
¶
(14)
Itisimpossibleto learn about the discontinuity in the functiongi2 for any particular district i, but an average
of the discontinuity gaps across districts is identiﬁable by the data.
Let Yi2 (v) ≡ E [Vi2|Vi1 = v]=gi2 (v), and note that ei1 is non-degenerate with smooth density.
Letting I be the random variable for the identity of a randomly drawn district (I =1 ,...,N), with some
re-arrangement and application of Theorem 3 it is true that
lim
∆→0+ E [VI2|0 <V I1 < ∆] − lim
∆→0+ E [VI2| − ∆ <V I1 < 0] (15)
= lim
∆→0+ E [YI2|0 <V I1 < ∆] − lim
∆→0+ E [YI2| − ∆ <V I1 < 0]
=
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c) of Theorem 3 also holds, which implies that any variable determined prior to election 2 should
have – in the limit – the same distribution in both the treatment (Democrat won election 1) and control
(Republican won election 1) states, in a neighborhood of the threshold (50 percent).
3.3 Data Issues
Data on U.S. Congressional election returns from 1946-1998 are used in the analysis. In order to use all
pairs of consecutive elections for the analysis, the two equation systems are “stacked” so the dependent
15variable is effectively dated from 1948 to 1998, and the independent variable runs from 1946 to 1996. Due
to re-districting every 10 years, and since both lags and leads of the vote share will be used, all cases where
the independent variable is from a year ending in ‘0’ and ‘2’ are excluded. Because of dependence over
time, standard errors are clustered at the decade-district level.
In virtually all Congressional elections, the strongest two parties will be the Republicans and the
Democrats, but third parties do obtain some small share of the vote. As a result, the cutoff that determines
the winner will not be exactly 50 percent. To address this, the main vote share variable is the Democratic
vote share minus the vote share of the strongest opponent, which in most cases is a Republican nominee.
The Democrat wins the election when this variable “Democratic vote share margin of victory” crosses the
0 threshold, and loses the election otherwise.
Incumbency advantage estimates are reported for the Democratic party only. In a strictly two-party
system, estimates for the Republican party would be an exact mirror image, with numerically identical
results,sinceDemocraticvictoriesandvoteshareswouldhaveone-to-onecorrespondenceswithRepublican
losses and vote shares.
Theincumbency advantage is analyzed at the level of the party at the district level. That is, theanal-
ysis focuses on the advantage to the party from holding the seat, irrespective of which candidate becomes
the nominee for the party. Estimation of the analogous effect for the individual candidate is complicated
by selective “drop-out”. That is, candidates, whether they win or lose an election, are not compelled to
run for (re-)election in the subsequent period. Thus, even a randomized experiment is corrupted by this
selective attrition.7 Since the goal is to highlight the parallels between RDD and a randomized experiment,
the analysis abstracts from the drop-out problem, and estimates are constructed at the level of the party;
when a candidate runs uncontested, the opposing party is given a vote share of 0.
Four measures of the success of the party in the subsequent election are used: 1) the probability
that the party’s candidate will both become the party’s nominee and win the election, 2) the probability that
7 An earlier draft (Lee 1999) explores what restrictions on strategic interactions between the candidates can be placed to pin
down the incumbency advantage for the candidate for the subpopulation of candidates who would run again whether or not they
lose theinitialelection. Abounding analysissuggeststhatmostof theincumbencyadvantage maybedueto a“quality of candidate”
selection effect, whereby the effect on drop-out leads to, on average, weaker nominees for the party in the next election.
16the party’s candidate will become the nominee in the election, 3) the party’s vote share (irrespective of who
is the nominee), and 4) the probability that the party wins the seat (irrespective of who is the nominee).
The ﬁrst two outcomes measure the causal impact of a Democratic victory on the political future of the
candidate, and the latter two outcomes measure the causal impact of a Democratic victory on the party’s
hold on the district seat.
3.4 RDD Estimates
Figure IIa illustrates the regression discontinuity estimate of the incumbency advantage. It plots the esti-
mated probability of a Democrat both running in and winning election t+1as a function of the Democratic
vote share margin of victory in election t. The horizontal axis measures the Democratic vote share minus
the vote share of the Democrats’ strongest opponent (virtually always a Republican). Each point is an aver-
age of the indicator variable for running in and winning election t+1for each interval, which is 0.005 wide.
To the left of the dashed vertical line, the Democratic candidate lost election t; to the right, the Democrat
won.
As apparent from the ﬁgure, there is a striking discontinuous jump, right at the 0 point. Democrats
who barely win an election are much more likely to run for ofﬁceandsucceedinthenextelection, compared
to Democrats who barely lose. The causal effect is enormous: about 0.45 in probability. Nowhere else is
a jump apparent, as there is a well-behaved, smooth relationship between the two variables, except at the
threshold that determines victory or defeat.
Figures IIIa, IVa, and Va present analogous pictures for the three other electoral outcomes: whether
or not the Democrat remains the nominee for the party in election t +1 , the vote share for the Democratic
party in the district in election t +1 , and whether or not the Democratic party wins the seat in election
t +1 .A l lﬁgures exhibit signiﬁcant jumps at the threshold. They imply that for the individual Democratic
candidate, the causal effect of winning an election on remaining the party’s nominee in the next election
is about 0.40 in probability. The incumbency advantage for the Democratic party appears to be about 7 or
8 percent of the vote share. In terms of the probability that the Democratic party wins the seat in the next
17election, the effect is about 0.35.
In all four ﬁgures, there is a positive relationship between the margin of victory and the electoral
outcome. For example, as in Figure IVa, the Democratic vote shares in election t and t +1are positively
correlated, both on the left and right side of the ﬁgure. This indicates selection bias; a simple comparison of
means of Democratic winners and losers would yield biased measures of the incumbency advantage. Note
also that Figures IIa, IIIa, and Va exhibit important nonlinearities: a linear regression speciﬁcation would
hence lead to misleading inferences.
Table I presents evidence consistent with the main implication of Theorem 3: in the limit, there is
randomized variation in treatment status. The third to eighth rows of Table I are averages of variables that
are determined before t, and for elections decided by narrower and narrower margins. For example, in the
third row, among the districts where Democrats won in election t, the average vote share for the Democrats
in election t−1 was about 68 percent; about 89 percent of the t−1 elections had been won by Democrats,
as the fourth row shows. The ﬁfth and seventh rows report the average number of terms the Democratic
candidate served, and the average number of elections in which the individual was a nominee for the party,
asofelection t. Again, these characteristics are alreadydeterminedatthe time of theelection. Thesixth and
eighth rows report the number of terms and number of elections for the Democratic candidates’ strongest
opponent. These rows indicate that where Democrats win in election t, the Democrat appears to be a
relatively stronger candidate, and the opposing candidate weaker, compared to districts where the Democrat
eventually loses election t. For each of these rows, the differences become smaller as one examines closer
and closer elections – as c) of Theorem 3 would predict.
These differences persist when the margin of victory is less than 5 percent of the vote. This is,
however, to be expected: the sample average in a narrow neighborhood of a margin of victory of 5 percent
is in general a biased estimate of the true conditional expectation function at the 0 threshold when that
function has a nonzero slope. To address this problem, polynomial approximations are used to generate
simple estimates of the discontinuity gap. In particular, the dependent variable is regressed on a fourth-
order polynomial in the Democratic vote share margin of victory, separately for each side of the threshold.
18The ﬁnal set of columns report the parametric estimates of the expectation function on either side of the
discontinuity. Several non-parametric and semi-parametric procedures are also available to estimate the
conditional expectation function at 0. For example, Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001) suggest local
linear regression, and Porter suggests adapting Robinson’s (1988) estimator to the RDD.
The ﬁnal columns in Table I show that when the parametric approximation is used, all remaining
differences between Democratic winners and losers vanish. No differences in the third to eighth rows are
statistically signiﬁcant. These data are consistent with implication c) of Theorem 3, that all pre-determined
characteristics are balanced in a neighborhood of the discontinuity threshold. Figures IIb, IIIb, IVb, and
Vb, also corroborate this ﬁnding. These lower panels examine variables that have already been determined
as of election t: the average number of terms the candidate has served in Congress, the average number
of times he has been a nominee, as well as electoral outcomes for the party in election t − 1.T h eﬁgures,
which also suggest that the fourth order polynomial approximations are adequate, show a smooth relation
between each variable and the Democratic vote share margin at t, as implied by c) of Theorem 3.
The only differences in Table I that do not vanish completely as one examines closer and closer
elections, are the variables in the ﬁrst two rows of Table I. Of course, the Democratic vote share or the
probability ofa Democraticvictory inelectiont+1is determined after the election t. Thus the discontinuity
g a pi nt h eﬁnal set of columns represents the RDD estimate of the causal effect of incumbency on those
outcomes.
In the analysis of randomized experiments, analysts often include baseline covariates in a regres-
sion analysis to reduce sampling variability in the impact estimates. Because the baseline covariates are
independent of treatment status, impact estimates are expected to be somewhat insensitive to the inclusion
of these covariates. Table II shows this to be true for these data: the results are quite robust to various
speciﬁcations. Column (1) reports the estimated incumbency effect when the vote share is regressed on the
victory (in election t) indicator, the quartic in the margin of victory, and their interactions. The estimate
should and does exactly match the differences in the ﬁrst row of the last set of columns in Table I. Column
(2) adds to that regression the Democratic vote share in t−1 and whether they won in t−1.T h ec o e f ﬁcient
19on the Democratic share in t − 1 is statistically signiﬁcant. Note that the coefﬁcient on victory in t does
not change. The coefﬁcient also does not change when the Democrat and opposition political and electoral
experience variables are included in Columns (3)-(5).
The estimated effect also remains stable when a completely different method of controlling for
pre-determined characteristics is utilized. In Column (6), the Democratic vote share t +1is regressed
on all pre-determined characteristics (variables in rows three through eight), and the discontinuity jump is
estimated using the residuals of this initial regression as the outcome variable. The estimated incumbency
advantage remains at about 8 percent of the vote share. This should be expected if treatment is locally
independent of all pre-determined characteristics. Since the average of those variables are smooth through
the threshold, so should be a linear function of those variables. This principle is demonstrated in Column
(7), where the vote share in t − 1 is subtracted from the vote share in t +1and the discontinuity jump in
that difference is examined. Again, the coefﬁcient remains at about 8 percent.
Column (8) reports a ﬁnal speciﬁcation check of the regression discontinuity design and estimation
procedure. I attempt to estimate the “causal effect” of winning in election t o nt h ev o t es h a r ei nt−1.S i n c e
we know that the outcome of election t cannot possibly causally effect the electoral vote share in t − 1,
the estimated impact should be zero. If it signiﬁcantly departs from zero, this calls into question, some
aspect of the identiﬁcation strategy and/or estimation procedure. The estimated effect is essentially 0, with
a fairly small estimated standard error of 0.011. All speciﬁcations in Table II were repeated for the indicator
variable for a Democrat victory in t +1as the dependent variable, and the estimated coefﬁcient was stable
across speciﬁcations at about 0.38 and it passed the speciﬁcation check of Column (8) with a coefﬁcient of
-0.005 with a standard error of 0.033.
In summary, the econometric model of election returns outlined in the previous section allows
for a great deal of non-random selection. The seemingly mild continuity assumption on the distribution
of eit results in the strong prediction of local independence of treatment status (Democratic victory) that
itself has an “inﬁnite” number of testable predictions. The distribution of any variable determined prior to
assignment must be virtually identical on either side of the discontinuity threshold. The empirical evidence
20is consistent with these predictions, suggesting that even though U.S. House elections are non-random
selection mechanisms – where outcomes are inﬂuenced by political actors – they also contain randomized
experiments that can be exploited by RD analysis.
3.5 Comparison to Existing estimates of the Incumbency Advantage
It is difﬁcult to make a direct comparison between the above RDD estimates and existing estimates of the
incumbency advantage in the political science literature. This is because there are really two aspects to
the incumbency advantage: the incumbent legislator advantage, and the incumbent party advantage. The
existing literature generally focuses on the ﬁrst concept, and the RDD estimates here focus on the second.
Measuring the incumbent legislator advantage answers the question From the party’s perspective,
what is the electoral gain to having the incumbent legislator run for re-election, relative to having a new
candidate o ft h es a m ep a r t yrun in the same district?8 This incumbency advantage is the electoral success
that an incumbent party enjoys if the incumbent runs for re-election, over and above the electoral outcome
that would have occurred if a new nominee for the party had run in the same district.9
By contrast, measuring the incumbent party advantage answers the question From the party’s per-
spective, what is the electoral gain to being the incumbent party in a district, relative to not being the
incumbent party? In other words, while the incumbent party’s vote share typically exceeds 50 percent,
s o m eo ft h ev o t e sw o u l dh a v eb e e ng a i n e db yt h ep a r t ye v e ni fi th a dnot been in control of the seat.
The interested reader is referred to Appendix B, which explains the difference between the RDD
estimate of the incumbency advantage and estimates typically found in the political science literature.
8 The most precise statement of the counterfactual can be found in Gelman and King [1990], who use “potential outcomes”
notation, to deﬁne the “incumbency advantage”. They deﬁne the incumbency advantage in a district as a the difference between
“the proportion of the vote received by the incumbent legislator in his or her district...” and the “proportion of the vote received by
the incumbent party in that district, if the incumbent legislator does not run...”
9 This notion is also expressed in Alford and Brady [1993], who note that incumbents can incidentally beneﬁtf r o mt h ep a r t y
holding the seat, and that the personal incumbency advantage should be differentiated from the party advantage, and that “[i]t is
this concept of personal incumbency advantage that most of the incumbency literature, and the related work in the congressional
literature, implicitly turns on.” Examples of typical incumbency studies that utilize this concept of incumbency include: Payne
[1980], Alford and Hibbing [1981], Collie [1981], and Garand and Gross [1984]. More recently, work by Ansolabehere and Snyder
[2001, 2002], and Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart [2000] implicitly examine this concept by examining the coefﬁcient on the
same incumbency variable deﬁned in Gelman and King [1990]: 1 if a Democrat incumbent seeks re-election, 0 if it is an open seat,
and -1 if a Republican seeks re-election.
214C o n c l u s i o n
In one sense, the RDD is no different from all other research designs: causal inferences are only
possible as a direct result of key statistical assumptions about how treatment is assigned to individuals. The
key assumption examined in this paper is the continuity of the density of Vi. What makes the treatment
assignment mechanism described in this paper somewhat distinctive is that what appears to be a weak con-
tinuity assumption directly leads to very restrictive stochastic properties for treatment status. Randomized
variation in treatment – independence (local to the threshold) – is perhaps the most restrictive property
possible, with potentially an inﬁnite number of testable restrictions, corresponding to the number of pre-
determined characteristics and the number of avilable moments for each variable. These testable restrictions
are an advantage when seeking to subject the research design to a battery of over-identifying tests.
Although the continuity assumption appears to be a weak restriction – particularly since it is im-
plicitly made in most selection models in econometrics – there are reasons to believe they might be violated
when agents have direct and precise control over the score Vi. Iftherearebeneﬁtstoreceivingthetreatment,
it is natural to expect those who gain the most to choose their value of Vi to be above – and potentially just
marginally above – the relevant threshold. Ruling out this kind of behavior – that which would violate the
continuous density assumption – appears to be an important part of theoretically justifying the application
of the RDD in any particular context.
22Appendix A. Appendix A: Description of Data
The data used for this analysis is based on the candidate-level Congressional election returns for the U.S.,
from ICPSR study 7757, “Candidate and Constituency Statistics of Elections in the United States, 1788-
1990”.
The data were initially checked for internal consistencies (e.g. candidates’ vote totals not equalling
reportedtotalvotecast), and correctedusingpublished andofﬁcial sources (Congressional Quarterly [1997]
and the United States House of Representatives Ofﬁce of the Clerk’s Web Page). Election returns from
1992-1998 were taken from the United States House of Representatives Ofﬁce of the Clerk’s Web Page,
and appended to these data. Various states (e.g. Arkansas, Louisiana, Florida, and Oklahoma) have laws
that do not require the reporting of candidate vote totals if the candidate ran unopposed. If they are the only
candidate in the district, they were assigned a vote share of 1. Other individual missing vote totals were
replaced with valid totals from published and ofﬁcial sources. Individuals with more than one observation
in a district year (e.g. separate Liberal and Democrat vote totals for the same person in New York and
Connecticut) were given the total of the votes, and were assigned to the party that gave the candidate the
mostvotes. Thenameofthecandidatewasparsedintolastname, ﬁrst name, and middle names, and sufﬁxes
such as “Jr., Sr., II, III, etc.”
Since the exact spelling of the name differs across years, the following algorithm was used to
create a unique identiﬁer for an individual that could match the person over time. Individuals were ﬁrst
matched on state, ﬁrst 5 characters of the last name, and ﬁrst initial of the ﬁrst name. The second layer
of the matching process isolates those with a sufﬁx such as Jr. or Sr., and small number of cases were
hand-modiﬁed using published and ofﬁcial sources. This algorithm was checked by drawing a random
sample of 100 election-year-candidate observations from the original sample, tracking down every separate
election the individual ran in (using published and ofﬁcial sources; this expanded the random sample to
517 election-year-candidate observations), and asking how well the automatic algorithm performed. The
fraction of observations from this “truth” sample that matched with the processed data was 0.982. The
23fraction of the processed data for which there was a “true” match was 0.992. Many different algorithms
were tried, but the algorithm above performed best based on the random sample.
Throughout the sample period (1946-1998), in about 3 percent of the total possible number of
elections (based on the number of seats in the House in each year), no candidate was reported for the
election. I impute the missing values using the following algorithm. Assign the state-year average electoral
outcome; if still missing, assign the state-decade average electoral outcome.
Two main data sets are constructed for the analysis. For all analysis at the Congressional level,
I keep all years that do not end in ‘0’ or ‘2’. This is because, strictly speaking, Congressional districts
cannot be matched between those years, due to decennial re-districting, and so in those years, the previous
or next electoral outcome is undeﬁned. The ﬁnal data set has 6558 observations. For the analysis at the
individual candidate level, one can use more years, because, despite re-districting, it is still possible to
know if a candidate ran in some election, as well as the outcome. This larger dataset has 9674 Democrat
observations.
Forthesakeofconciseness, theempiricalanalysisinthepaperfocusesonobservationsforDemocrats
only. This is done to avoid the “double-counting” of observations, since in a largely two-party context, a
winning Democrat will, by construction, produce a losing Republican in that district and vice versa. (It is
unattractive to compare a close winner to the closer loser in the same district) In reality, there are third-party
candidates, so a parallel analysis done by focusing on Republican candidates will not give a literal mirror
image of the results. However, since third-party candidates tend not to be important in the U.S. context, it
turns out that all of the results are qualitatively the same, and are available from the author upon request.
24Appendix B. Appendix B: A Comparison of Regression Discontinuity
Design and other estimates of the Incumbency Advantage
Reviewsoftheexistingmethodological literatureinGelmanandKing[1990], AlfordandBrady[1993], and
Jacobson [1997] suggest that most of the research on incumbency are variants of three general approaches
– the “sophomore surge”, the “retirement slump”, and the Gelman-King index [1990].10 Appendix Figures
Ia and Ib illustrate the differences between these three approaches and the regression discontinuity strategy
employed in this paper. They also clearly show that the three commonly-used approaches to measuring the
“incumbency advantage” are estimating the incumbent legislator advantage as opposed to the incumbent
party advantage. The regression discontinuity design is ideally suited for estimating the latter incumbency
advantage.
Appendix Figure Ia illustrates the idea behind the “sophomore surge”. The solid line shows a
hypothetical relationship between the average two-party Democratic vote share in period 2 – V2 –a sa
function of the Democratic vote share in period 1, V1. In addition, the dotted line just below the solid line
on the right side of the graph represents the average V2 as a function of V1, for the sub-sample of elections
that were won by ﬁrst-time Democrats in period 1.11 The idea behind the sophomore surge is to subtract
fromthe averageV2 for allDemocraticﬁrst-time incumbents (V 2), an amountthatrepresents the strength of
the party in those districts apart from any incumbent legislator advantage. The “sophomore surge” approach
subtracts off V 1, the average V1 for those same Democratic ﬁrst-time incumbents.
Appendix Figure Ib illustrates how the “retirement slump” is a parallel measure to the “sophomore
surge”. In this ﬁgure, the dashed line below the solid line represents the average V2 as a function of V1,
for those districts that will have open seats as of period 2. In other words, it is the relationship for those
districts in which the Democratic incumbent retires and does not seek re-election in period 2. Here, the idea
is to subtract from the average vote share gained by the retiring Democratic incumbents (V 1), an amount
10 See Gelman and King [1990] for a concise review of existing methods as of 1990. More recently, Levitt and Wolfram [1997]
use a “modiﬁed sophomore surge” approach and Cox and Katz [1996] use a speciﬁcation “adapted from Gelman and King [1990]”.
11 In principle, a “mirror-image” line exists for the Republican ﬁrst-time incumbents. But I omit the line to make the graph clearer.
Also, note that in this graph, to simplify exposition, I am assuming that all ﬁrst-time incumbents seek re-election. The basic ideas
hold when relaxing this assumption, but the notation is slightly more cumbersome.
25that reﬂects the strength of the party. The “retirement slump” approach subtracts off V 2, the average V2 for
the incoming Democratic candidate in those districts.
Appendix Figure Ib also illustrates Gelman and King’s approach to measuring incumbency advan-
tage. The dotted line above the solid line is the average V2, as a function of V1, for those districts in
which the Democratic incumbent is seeking re-election. The idea behind their approach is to subtract from
the average vote share V2 gained by incumbents seeking re-election, an amount that reﬂects how the party
would perform if a new candidate ran for the party, while controlling for the lagged vote share V1. Thus, the
gap between the parallel dashed and dotted lines in Appendix Figure Ib represent the incumbent legislator
advantage measured by the Gelman-King index (ψ).12
Finally, Appendix Figures Ia and Ib illustrate that the approach of the regression discontinuity
design isolates a different aspect of the incumbency advantage – the incumbent party advantage. The idea
is to make a comparison of the electoral performance in period 2 of the Democratic party between districts
that were barely won (say, by 0.1 percent of the vote) and districts that were barely lost by the Democratic
party in period 1. It is shown in the next section that these two groups of districts could be considered,
on average, comparable along all other pre-election observable and unobservable characteristics, so that
any difference in the subsequent e l e c t i o no u t c o m e sc a nb ep r o p e r l ya t t r i b u t e dt oacausal effect of party
incumbency. Thus the regression discontinuity estimate (β) is depicted by the discontinuous jumps in the
solid lines at the 0.50 threshold in Appendix Figures Ia and Ib.13
The ﬁgures show that the discontinuity gap directly addresses the counterfactual question that is at
the heart of measuring the incumbent party advantage: How would the Democratic party have performed in
period 2, had they not held the seat (i.e. had the Democrats lost the election in period 1)? The best way to
estimate that quantity is to examine elections where the Democrats just barely missed being the incumbent
party for the election in period 2 – the point on the solid line just to the left of the 0.50 threshold.
Appendix Figures Ia and Ib show that there is also no necessary mechanical connection between
12 Again, the mirror-image dotted and dashed lines for Republicans are ignored to make the exposition clearer in the graph.
13 While it is tempting to equate β here to β2 in equation 6 of Gelman and King [1990], this would be incorrect, because Gelman
and King include their key variable, I2, in the sepeciﬁcation. (If they did not include I2, their key variable, then β2 would equal β
here). Thus, the regression discontinuity estimates presented in this paper cannot be recovered from a Gelman-King-type analysis.
26the two incumbency advantage concepts. For example, the regression discontinuity estimate could be zero
(no break in the solid lines at 0.50), while the sophomore surge, retirement slump, and Gelman-King index
could be simultaneously signiﬁcant. Alternatively, in principle, there could be a large estimate of β, while
a tt h es a m et i m et h eo t h e rm e a s u r e sc o u l db ez e r o .
A ﬁnal important point is that the sophomore surge relies upon situations where either an incumbent
isdefeated oraseat isthrownopen, andtheretirement slump, andGelman-Kingindexreliesuponsituations
where seats are thrown open by an incumbent that does not seek re-election. In principle, for any year in
which no new candidate was able to defeat an incumbent and in which all incumbents sought re-election
(and ignoring re-districting years) itwould be impossible to estimate any of those three measures; the dotted
anddashedlinesinAppendixFiguresIaandIbwouldnotexist. Inthiscase, theonlyincumbencyadvantage
that could be measured would be the incumbent party advantage.
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Figure IIa: Candidate's Probability of Winning Election t+1, by 
Margin of Victory in Election t: local averages and parametric fit
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Figure IIb: Candidate's Accumulated Number of Past Election 
Victories, by Margin of Victory in Election t: local averages and 
parametric fit
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Figure IIIa: Candidate's Probability of Candidacy in Election t+1, 
by Margin of Victory in Election t: local averages and parametric fit
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Figure IIIb: Candidate's Accumulated Number of Past Election 
Attempts, by Margin of Victory in Election t: local averages and 
parametric fit
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Figure IVa: Democrat Party's Vote Share in Election t+1, by 
Margin of Victory in Election t: local averages and parametric fit
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Figure IVb: Democratic Party Vote Share in Election t-1, by Margin
of Victory in Election t: local averages and parametric fit
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Figure Va: Democratic Party Probability Victory in Election t+1, by 
Margin of Victory in Election t: local averages and parametric fit
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Figure Vb: Democratic Probability of Victory in Election t-1, by 
Margin of Victory in Election t: local averages and parametric fit
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Appendix Figure Ia: Identification of Incumbency Advantage: 
Sophomore Surge vs. Regression Discontinuity
Appendix Figure Ib: Identification of Incumbency Advantage: 
Gelman-King and Retirement Slump vs. Regression Discontinuity
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